


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
RESEARCH REPORT

US CIVIC ACTION: A PRAGMATIC AND POTENTIALLY
DECISIVE FOREIGN AID OPTION FOR DEVELOPING
NATIONS IN THE PACIFIC BASIN

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US CIVIC ACTION:
A PRAGMATIC AND POTENTIALLY DECISIVE
FOREIGN AID OPTION FOR DEVELOPING NATIONS
IN THE PACIFIC BASIN

by

Dennis C. Cochrane
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH
REQUIREMENT

Research Advisor: Colonel David G. Kimball

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 1988

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: US Civic Action: A Pragmatic and Potentially
Decisive Foreign Aid Option for Developing Nations
in the Pacific Basin

AUTHOR: Dennis C. Cochrane, Lieutenant Colonel, USA

The United States is faced with an increased threat to its security and national interests posed by the Soviet Union in the Pacific Basin. Faced with the economic realities of having to reduce its defense budget in the wake of Soviet expansionism, the US must adopt a new strategy that maximizes the effectiveness of all available assets. The author proposes expanding the ongoing military civic action program in the Pacific, as well as combining it with the efforts of the Peace Corps under auspices of the Department of State. Following some background information concerning each activity's capabilities and current operations, the author presents a proposal for formally combining their efforts focusing on the corresponding advantages and disadvantages.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis C. Cochrane (M.S. M.E., University of Texas at El Paso) has been directly involved in US Military Civic Action throughout the Pacific Basin since being stationed at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, in 1980. He served as the senior engineer advisor to the 411th Engineer Battalion (Combat) (Heavy), (US Army Reserve), providing technical assistance during numerous construction exercises throughout the Pacific theater. He subsequently served as the executive officer and commander of the 84th Engineer Battalion (Combat) (Heavy), 45th General Support Group, US Army Pacific, and for two years was responsible for the fielding and training of all Civic Action Teams deployed to the islands of Pohnpei and Kosrae, Federated States of Micronesia. He provided an engineer CAT in 1986 for the Exercise Balikatan in the Philippines. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College in 1980, and is currently a student at the Air War College, class of 1988.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the past four decades, the most significant threat to the security and national interests of the United States has been the global challenge posed by the Soviet Union. Fundamental differences in political, social, and economic beliefs and objectives have led to an adversarial relationship between the superpowers. Nevertheless, the United States and the Soviet Union share the common goal of avoiding direct confrontation and reducing the threat of nuclear war. The real challenge for America, in this dynamic and complex time in history, is how to best realize the commonality of interests so as to preserve peace without jeopardizing our national security and our commitment to freedom and justice. (18:6)

In the words of President Reagan:

Today it is more important than ever before that our National Security Strategy be based on a solid understanding of U.S. interests and objectives, and a realistic approach to dealing with the Soviet Union and other threats to U.S. security. (18:4)

In essence, our strategy must be realistic and flexible so as to adapt to a changing world. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty is a clear testimony to our ability to adapt in the arms control arena and constructively work with our adversaries in the spirit of world peace. Reduction in both strategic and conventional

forces seems highly likely; a situation which just a few years ago appeared virtually impossible. Although the European theater has and will continue to remain the primary focus of our national security strategy in the near term, I would argue that the United States can no longer continue to take the Pacific theater for granted. "Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of the growing importance of the Pacific Basin is in the tremendous shift in the world's economic center of gravity from the Atlantic to the Pacific."

(13:22) To illustrate this point, in 1982 the US trade with the Pacific was 109.5% of European trade. Based on conservative growth projections, by the year 2000 the Asian-Pacific GNP will be 90% of the combined GNP of the US and Europe. Although the Soviet Union is currently only able to compete militarily, in July 1986 the Soviet Party leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev asserted in his famous speech at Vladivostok the Soviet Union's claim to be a Pacific power with legitimate reasons to be involved in the affairs of the region. It would appear that the Pacific Basin may serve as the cockpit for future superpower rivalry. (1:155)

The purpose of this paper is to advocate the expanded use of US Civic Action as an inexpensive, pragmatic, and potentially decisive foreign assistance option for countering Soviet expansionism throughout the developing island nations of the Pacific Basin. To support this argument I will first review the geographic and the

strategic significance of the region in the context of US national interests. Following a discussion on the international environment and some corresponding basic assumptions for the future, I will present possible US strategy to counter the threat with primary emphasis on foreign assistance and its subsets of military assistance and civic action. My intent is to concentrate on the ongoing, joint-service civic action program in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of Palau and the potential role this type of program can have if expanded, combined with other organizations such as the Peace Corps and tailored to the needs of the developing island nations. A pro-active, nation-building approach is a win-win strategy. Simply stated, US Civic Action simultaneously supports the establishment and development of a nation's infrastructure and fosters a positive US image to the local population at all levels of society.

CHAPTER II

PACIFIC THEATER OVERVIEW AND US NATIONAL INTERESTS

To obtain an understanding of the Pacific Basin, one must include the nations of East Asia due to their collective interdependence. Geographically, the East Asia-Pacific region (Appendix 1) comprises almost one-third of the earth's surface including approximately 50 countries and nearly three-fifths of the world's population. Politically, this region spans the entire spectrum from democracy to communism. Economically, this region is extremely significant and has enormous potential. Trade between the United States and Japan represents one-third of the world's gross national product. Six of America's most vital strategic raw materials are located here. Militarily, this region has nearly 12 million men under arms and contains vital and potentially vulnerable shipping lanes and sea lines of communication. Without question, the East Asia-Pacific region has tremendous strategic importance.

(26:18-20)

Emerging from within the vast Pacific Ocean frontier are numerous island nations that comprise the last part of the globe to be granted full independence. Located primarily in the Southern, Western, and Southwestern Pacific, many of the microstates have been plagued by underdevelopment and are currently charting courses for

economic and political survival. Among those islands still under the colonial yoke, strident nationalist movements are forging a new regional spirit supporting an independent and nuclear-free Pacific. For example, in the French territory of New Caledonia, the indigenous Kanak people are aggressively pursuing a course for independence even at the expense of a potentially bloody civil war. The Republic of Palau has remained steadfast in its decision not to permit nuclear warheads in its domain. (3:84) Historically, this region has been exclusively aligned with the Western powers, and as a result the United States has appeared to take its preeminent position in the region almost for granted. It is absolutely essential that the US formulate a long-term, pro-active national strategy based on mutual interests of these developing countries. (15:1134)

In January 1987, President Reagan clearly stated our national interests as follows:

1. The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation with its fundamental values and institutions intact.
2. The growth of freedom and democratic institutions throughout the world. We must be the role model in advocating concern for human rights.
3. A healthy and growing economy.
4. The growth of free market economies throughout the world linked by a fair and open international trading

system. The US and our allies must have access to foreign energy and vital mineral resources.

5. A stable and secure world, free of major threats to US interests. We must neutralize the efforts of the Soviet Union to increase its influence in this region.

6. The health and vigor of US alliance relationships. (18:4)

In the Pacific Basin, political and economic interests should be dominant in our strategy. Until recently, the Soviets have had little influence in a region often regarded since World War II as the "American Lake." I would argue that the United States could best insure the future stability and security of the Pacific and secure our national interests by focusing on political concerns and fostering economic cooperation.

CHAPTER III

CURRENT INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND FUTURE ASSUMPTIONS

Having listed the US national interests, it is necessary to examine the current international environment and to forecast possible changes over the next decade that may affect these developing island nations. I believe the most significant and potentially threatening prospects in the Pacific Basin include: Soviet expansionism and destabilizing activity by Soviet client states; political instability; the rise in nationalism; the movement toward a nuclear-free zone; and the economic outlook. I will address each of these topics in that order.

Soviet Expansionism and Destabilizing Client State Activity

A growing Soviet military presence in the East Asia-Pacific region is serious cause for concern and represents a significant threat to the third world island nations. The Soviet Pacific Fleet at Vladivostok and Petropavlosk is the largest of her four fleets and consists of over 700 ships. Soviet access to former US naval facilities in Vietnam provides a strategic foothold and power projection base. Soviet ground forces of approximately 450,000 and its nuclear arsenal seem to be a primary threat to the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. Recent Soviet commercial fishing treaties with Kiribati in 1985 and Vanuatu in 1987

have given the Soviets additional access and intelligence gathering opportunities in the South Pacific. (15:1141)

Despite being located nearly halfway around the world, Libya has initiated extensive destabilizing activities in the Pacific. Within this past year, Libyan agents have offered arms and cash to rebels in Papua New Guinea, encouraged an aboriginal separatist movement in Australia, shipped weapons to dissidents in New Caledonia, and tried to open an office in the island Republic of Vanuatu. Why Libya would want a foothold in the South Pacific remains unclear, however, some Western observers believe their presence may foreshadow a larger political offensive by the Soviet Union. (5:45)

North Korea and Vietnam should remain serious threats to stability on the Asian continent, but should not pose as significant a threat throughout the Pacific region. North Korea still insists on reunification and continues to conduct terrorist operations in support of that objective. Vietnam's occupation forces in Kampuchea serve as evidence of its quest to be the dominant nation in Southeast Asia.

Political Instability

Several island nations have undergone attempts to have their democratic form of government overthrown. Most noteworthy is the Philippines in which repeated unsuccessful attempts have occurred to oust President Aquino by the radical New People's Army and former President Marcos

sympathizers. In addition, on 14 May 1987 the first successful military coup in the South Pacific region occurred in Fiji which created constitutional chaos and the demise of their democratic form of government. Although Fiji's long history of racial unrest is distinctive, the coup reinforces the argument that change within the Pacific region provides the most immediate challenge to stability. "The root causes of instability seem to be found in the struggle of small, usually aid-dependent countries, to cope with the social, economic, and political problems of very rapid maturization." (20:128)

Rise in Nationalism

Throughout the Pacific region, island nations have sought the opportunity for self-determination. Normally supported by the United States, in some cases this has caused strained relations or threats to our facilities. As an example, the basing agreement with the Philippines (Subic Bay and Clark Airbase) is due to expire in 1991, and there is no guarantee the US will agree to their demand for much higher compensation. The antipathy of many Pacific nations toward the US is extremely troublesome. (6:132)

Nuclear-Free Zone Movement

In addition to the rise in nationalism, several island nations have declared their territory as nuclear-free zones. New Zealand has adopted a policy which prohibits any nuclear material being locally stored or stationed in its

ports or around its shores, and bans nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed vessels and aircraft. As a result, the popular anti-nuclearism has caused the suspension of the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) defense commitment with New Zealand. (30:1)

This nuclear-free zone dispute has further spilled over into the Republic of Palau. As part of the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, this island's population has repeatedly voted to reaffirm its unprecedented anti-nuclear Constitution. The United States has the responsibility for the defense of the island and has sought to have Palau ratify a "Compact of Free Association" which would grant them access to ports and airfields. However, this is currently not possible. The strategic importance of Palau (located 500 miles due east of the Philippines) is readily apparent as it represents our fallback position in the event the US should ever lose its facilities at Subic Bay and Clark Airbase. (24:27)

Especially worrisome to many developing island nations was the refusal in 1986 by the United States, Great Britain, and France to sign the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (known as the Treaty of Rarotonga). Initiated by the South Pacific Forum, it was intended to place a ban on nuclear testing and the dumping of nuclear waste in the region. The fact the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) signed the treaty further strained our

relationship with regional states. Obviously the Soviet Union and the PRC both test their nuclear weapons inside their borders and were eager to sign. Naturally Western nations that test nuclear weapons in the Pacific could not sign. (3:87)

Economic Outlook

The importance of US trade with the countries of the Southern, Western, and Southwestern Pacific has grown, but it remains small compared to trade with Japan and the East Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs) of Taiwan, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea. In 1986 the total two-way trade with Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and the Pacific Islands amounted to \$10.7 billion. In comparison, our trade with Japan, the NICs, and ASEAN was \$112 billion, \$67 billion, and \$15 billion respectively. (15:1129-1130)

The Pacific Basin contains numerous strategic mineral resources for which the US has a particular vulnerability. Cobalt, nickel, and manganese are the most critical. (2:6) The US must recognize that natural resources traditionally have played a major role in Soviet Foreign Policy and in fact Soviet leaders plan to develop their vast mineral resource potential and exploit it to obtain capitalist country dependence. (22:47-48) Also, they have attempted to control or influence mineral sources in the Third World. Legal questions remain as to the mining of manganese nodules

from the ocean depths, and these are being addressed through the Law of the Sea. In addition, these island nations surfaced their exclusive claim to fishing rights within 200 miles of their coast lines and in fact have seized American fishing vessels that have violated that limit.

Currently the US Congress is entertaining the passage of legislation to impose trade barriers on imports. Emerging island nations of the Pacific stand to be adversely affected by such action. As is often the case, their economies are very export-oriented and dependent on the United States market. Given this current international environment, let's discuss some future assumptions in order to adopt a realistic strategy in the Pacific.

Future Assumptions

The United States is clearly faced with having to adapt to a changing international environment. I believe that political and economic interests will remain dominant, but one must not rule out the military presence of the Soviet Union. Although many argue that overall the developing nations favor the West, Soviet expansionism and influence either directly, or indirectly through its client states, will continue. Enormous temptations will be felt by the political leaders of the developing nations when faced with signing commercial treaties to include basing rights in exchange for monetary considerations totalling up to 15% of that country's GNP. (15:1141) The rise in nationalism,

coupled with the movement toward a nuclear-free Pacific will continue, and it presents additional challenges for US national security policy formulation.

Economically, the current US administration recognizes the importance of open and free international trade and will resist Congressional pressure for protectionism. Unfortunately, domestic public support will probably increase to enact trade barriers, and some compromise appears inevitable. (15:1135) In addition to these factors, the United States is faced with a serious need to reduce its national debt. In late 1987, the Congress trimmed overall foreign assistance from \$13.2 billion in FY87 to \$12.9 billion in FY88. Over one-third of that total is pledged to Israel, Egypt, and El Salvador. The reductions must therefore fall disproportionately on other recipients, such as the Philippines--a country that received \$374 million in 1987 yet insists on more for our basing agreement. (16:9A) One must assume the trend of total US foreign assistance is on the decline when needs of the Pacific Basin nations are on the rise.

CHAPTER IV

CURRENT US MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC

Without question the Pacific region is a maritime theater and our military strategy is twofold--a wartime strategy and a peacetime strategy. Our warfighting strategy is centered on the concept of forward deployed, combat ready forces. Our peacetime strategy is to maintain a high degree of readiness through training exercises, expanded relations programs, and in the use of military forces to provide a stable environment. Contributing to disaster relief operations is an example of our peacetime strategy. My intent is to focus on our peacetime strategy, as I believe this will pay us the biggest dividends. (8:138-139)

In my view the United States must become more sensitive to the needs of the developing island nations. As the leader of the free world it is imperative that the projection of a favorable US image in the region through demonstrated support of these countries be our top priority. If successfully accomplished, this would serve as the cornerstone for the deterrence of Soviet expansionism and influence. Specifically, if we can find opportunities to assist in the economic development of these nations, we will have gone a long way in eliminating the root cause of potential political instability. President Reagan stated: "Our foreign policy must reflect the basic thrust of our

National Security Strategy--the promotion of our democratic way of life." (18:9) In addition, the US military peacetime strategy must be based on a system of strong security alliances, political roles, economic cooperation, and foreign assistance. A further analysis of each of these subjects is essential.

Alliance for Collective Security

A strong system of alliances and regional cooperation is essential to the preservation of peace. (21:48) As a part of the strengthening process, we must continue to support recently established initiatives, such as the expanded relations program, whereby allied military personnel and entire units can participate in our military schools, training, and field exercises. An example currently ongoing is the Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) that brings together senior allied military officers to discuss a variety of pertinent subjects to the region. Developing dialogue and contacts is a common feature of the program. (26:31-34)

Moral and Political Example

Our free, pluralistic society serves as a role model for the world. We must continue to endorse and support democratization and concern for human rights.

Diplomatic Mediation

We must continue to assist our allies in any regional conflict or dispute through political means if possible. Moreover, we must be sensitive to the needs of our allies.

Economic Cooperation

We must continue to adhere to the principles of an open and free world trading order that is mutually beneficial to all countries. Our permanent partnership with Japan is the keystone of American foreign policy in the Pacific. Furthermore, we should continue to support economic initiatives like the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference and various private trade and investment partnerships such as the Pacific Basin Economic Council. (28:2-3)

Foreign Assistance

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 with amendments authorizes the use of foreign aid and consists primarily of both economic and military assistance. The President is authorized to furnish military assistance without charge to eligible foreign countries, and it essentially consists of material, logistical support and related training.

(19:3,20) Despite reductions in foreign assistance dollars, the US can promote economic development in the Third World through an increase in the use of military civic action. Such a program is currently in place in the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of Palau.

CHAPTER V

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

In a traditional sense, military civic action (MCA) can be defined as those planned non-military uses of indigenous armed forces which apply expertise and resources for the betterment of the economic, social, and political status of the country. Fundamentally, it is the use of military resources in nation-building through a concept of self-help. (19:30)

In many instances, the most stable institution in many developing countries is its military forces. Specifically, the armed forces have an organizational, technical, and professional capability to help the local people in economic and social development. By working side by side with the military, the local population can contribute to their own improvement and obtain respect for their government. Any project undertaken should have a direct and immediate impact on the community. In short, this building of good will is absolutely essential in bonding a community, the military, and therefore the government together in a way which collectively inhibits the possibility for an insurgency movement. (19:33-34)

President Johnson recognized the potential role of military civic action in his 1 February 1966 Message to

Congress on the Foreign Aid Program:

. . .We shall give new stress to civic action programs through which local troops build schools and roads, and provide literacy training and health services. Through these programs, military personnel are able to play a more constructive role in their society, and establish better relations with the civilian population. (19:36)

President Kennedy had earlier stressed the use of military civic action in his 25 May 1961 Special Message to Congress:

. . .Where the will is present and only capacity is lacking, our military assistance program can be of help. But this program, like economic assistance, needs a new emphasis. It cannot be extended without regard to the social, political and economic reforms essential to internal respect and stability. The equipment and training provided must be tailored to legitimate local needs and to our own foreign and military policies, not to our supply of military stocks, or a local leader's desire for military display. And our military assistance can in addition to its military purposes make a contribution to economic progress. (19:36-37)

Military civic action has had a tendency to humanize the military at all levels. By engaging in MCA activities, the people see the military in a favorable light. Often the serviceman benefits as much as the civilian community in the strengthening of his leadership, initiative, training skills, and discipline. (19:37-38)

In building schools and roads, providing medical assistance, and teaching the local people, the military is not only aiding in community development, but is increasing both the political maturity of the ordinary citizen and his standard of living. In the final analysis, MCA tends to foster democracy. (19:39)

Although it would appear that the use of military personnel in the nation-building process is extremely advantageous, some critics have cautioned that there are some drawbacks. First, there are those who contend the use of the military in civic action operations brings the armed forces closer to the seat of government, and therefore gives the military too much voice. They feel this increases the possibility for a military coup. Second, the use of the military is in direct conflict with civilian labor organizations. In essence, contractors cannot compete with a cheaper military work force. Third, if the military can devote personnel resources to civic action, which at the same time does not degrade from their military capability, then the size of the military must be too large. (19:39-40)

For the most part, studies have shown that the economic posture of a country rather than the military posture is the more significant factor in judging a nation's political stability. A coup is more likely to result from political instability brought on by adverse economic conditions. Focusing the use of military resources in nation-building and economic development supports stability. As a classic example, during the 1950s Philippine Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay successfully used military civic action in a dual role of economic development and counter insurgency. He initiated land reforms and resettlement programs for landless

peasants. Magsaysay established the Economic Development Corps with the army as his agent. Army engineers utilized heavy construction equipment to clear public land and to build settlements and road networks. Government welfare workers were integrated with the construction program to teach community service, farming, sanitation, and homemaking. This coordinated strategy orchestrated at the top level of the Philippine Government proved highly effective and the communist led Huk (Hukbalahaps) movement was thwarted. (19:30-32)

Competition with the civilian labor organizations is a sensitive issue and is situation dependent. The military must focus its attention on undertaking projects that avoid such competition. It is imperative that the country have some type of organization that screens all necessary projects, decides on their priority for construction, their method of funding, and solicits civilian labor organization involvement up front. The military should supplement the civilian labor organization and be best utilized in remote locations. (19:44-47)

By-in-large, civic action represents a unique training opportunity to military personnel. What is hard to quantify is the positive image the military displays to the local population and the positive self-esteem the service member obtains for helping a fellow man. Thus, despite the criticism of the military civic action program, usually the

potential payoff far exceeds the liability. For a new and emerging nation, the use of military civic action is often paramount. As that nation establishes its infrastructure and economic base, a redirection of military civic action will result. Ideally, the goal of the armed forces is to eventually work their way out of this job. (19:47)

In order for military civic action to be successful, it must be a coordinated and planned effort with top government support. The higher the level of interest, coordination and planning, the greater the chance for success. Given limited resources, civilian and military agencies must set aside rivalry and focus their efforts on doing what is in their country's best interests. In summary, some type of administrative organization must be established and given the mission to oversee and direct all MCA projects. (19:47-48)

There are numerous recent examples of the use of US military civic action such as Vietnam and Central America. In each case there were various degrees of hostilities ongoing. However, in the Pacific Basin developing nations are for the most part not at war, and in fact few even have a military force. Such is the case in Micronesia.

CHAPTER VI

CURRENT US MILITARY CIVIC ACTION IN THE PACIFIC

Following World War II, the United States assumed the role of administering numerous Pacific island chains as trust territories under the United Nations. These trust territories included the Northern Mariana Islands, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau, located to the north, east, south, and west of the island of Guam respectively(Appendix 2). During the past 40 years each of these trust territories, with their vastly different cultures, have struggled to develop their economic, social, and political structures and gain some degree of independence. Today, only the Republic of Palau remains a trust territory. The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia have terminated their trust territory status, and face numerous internal challenges as newly emerging nations. In November 1986 the Federated States of Micronesia signed a "Compact of Free Association" with the United States in which we assume all responsibilities for their defense with the proviso that the FSM remain closed to military forces of other nations. The US has basing rights not only in FSM but also in the Northern Marianas and the Marshalls as well. (4:14) As

previously mentioned, the nuclear-free zone issue excludes our use of potential bases in Palau. (24:27)


The US Secretary of Defense in 1969 initiated a military civic action program in support of objectives established by the US Secretary of the Interior for the trust territories. Briefly stated these two primary US objectives were to assist the local populace by undertaking projects which are of particular interest to the emerging governments and to maintain a favorable US military presence. (7:1-2) Initially, funding for military civic action was provided exclusively by the Department of the Interior. In 1983 the funding was transferred to the Department of Defense and the military services. (27:1) Currently funding for the civic action program in FSM and Palau is on a shared basis between DOD and the island government. Specifically, under the Compact of Free Association, the cost to the island nations of having a dedicated on-station civic action program is \$250,000 per year, with DOD paying all related military costs. (10:1) The host nation funds all construction materials.

Throughout the past 20 years the Army, Air Force, and Navy have participated in military civic action in this region. What is unique is that these island nations do not have indigenous armed forces, and thus the coordination of our support is handled much differently than in the traditional sense. My intention is to examine in detail the

ongoing military civic action program in the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of Palau.

The military civic action program in FSM and Palau is a Department of Defense joint service endeavor involving the Army, Air Force, and Navy under the single management of the United States Commander-in-Chief Pacific (USCINCPAC), the unified commander. USCINCPAC Instruction 11000.1D with amendments serves as the governing regulation for the civic action team (CAT) program and it establishes objectives, responsibilities, funding, team composition, training, and taskings. (7:1-13) Command relationships are as shown on page 25. Operational control down to each CAT is exercised by USCINCPAC in Hawaii through his designated representative on Guam (USCINCPAC Rep Guam) and his Civic Action Detachment Commander (USCINCPAC Rep CAD). Headquartered at Camp Covington, Guam, the Civic Action Detachment Commander and his staff provides both day-to-day operational control for each of the deployed CATs and all related support to include logistics, medical, communications, food service, and personal item requirements. Furthermore, each service component commander within USCINCPAC exercises Command (less operational control) for service-related support, such as personnel administration for CAT members. (7:2-6) The USCINCPAC Rep Civic Action Detachment Commander on Guam serves a two-year tour and is the key billet in the program. He and his staff coordinate all deployment and

CAT PROGRAM COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS (7:1-1)



redeployment schedules, distinguished visitor schedules, resupply missions, on-site inspections, and emergency medical evacuation flights. (7:5-6)

A deployed CAT consists of 13 highly trained professionals and each service has a different approach to the process of selecting and fielding of the team. The Navy fields two civic action teams with one on the Republic of Palau and the other on the island of Yap, FSM. Personnel are utilized from parent Mobile Seabee Construction Battalions which are simultaneously deployed to Guam and Okinawa respectively for a period of approximately nine months. In essence, these personnel deploy from the Continental United States (CONUS) with their parent battalion, serve their deployment with a CAT rather than the parent battalion, and subsequently redeploy to the CONUS with their parent battalion.

The Air Force has one Prime Beef civic action team deployed to the Truk Islands, FSM. Like the Navy, their personnel are in a PCS status and serve a tour of about eight months. Team members are selected on a volunteer basis from assets worldwide. Once the team is selected, personnel train together for two months in California, and deploy through Guam to Truk.

The Army has yet a third approach deploying two civic action teams with one to the island of Pohnpei (also spelled Ponape), FSM, and the other to the island of Kosrae, FSM.

Personnel assets are used exclusively from the Corps of Engineers and specifically the 84th Engineer Battalion (Combat) (Heavy), 45th General Support Group, US Army Pacific Command (USARPAC), Hawaii. The 84th Engineer Battalion is a heavy construction unit similar to an Air Force Red Horse Squadron. Army personnel are predominately volunteers who serve on a CAT for six months in a TDY status and return to serve with the parent battalion. To conform with the culture of the host governments, only male personnel are deployed on a CAT.

In order to appreciate the details of the CAT programs, let me first provide a basic geographic, political, and social-economic overview of the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of Palau. As the map will indicate (see Appendix 2), the potential strategic role of this area is becoming increasingly important. Located roughly 3500 miles west of the Hawaiian Islands and across the International Date Line, Palau and FSM are south of Guam. From west to east, Palau is further positioned approximately 500 miles due east of the Philippines, followed by the four states of FSM (Yap, Truk, Pohnpei, and Kosrae). This collection of tiny islands is spread over one million square miles of water (the size of the continental US) and has a combined land area of 270 square miles, which is roughly the size of Rhode Island. The total population is slightly less than 100,000 with over 50% of the people

under the age of 15. Pohnpei, with a land area of 133 square miles is the largest island in FSM and has a population of about 25,000. Kosrae, the smallest island in FSM with a land area one-quarter that of Pohnpei, has approximately 7000 inhabitants. Located just north of the equator, these islands have a tropical climate with lush vegetation. Pohnpei, the second wettest spot in the world, receives in excess of 300 inches of rain per year. (4:14)

The federal and state government of FSM is similar to that of the United States. Each of the four islands have a state government and the federal government is co-located with the state government in Kolonia, Pohnpei. Each state is also subdivided into municipalities with each governed by municipal chief. Socially, each of the five islands has distinct cultures. Kosrae is a very traditional and conservative state where Christianity is the center of the society. By comparison, Pohnpei is very liberal. Yap still practices many ethnic traditions. Women are viewed very differently throughout the islands, but in general have little or no say in the society. English is the common language. What is apparent is the islands have been recently thrust into the 20th century and adjustment problems are evident. Economically, this region survives on agriculture and an abundance of fish. Paved roads and exports are few. Each island now has a paved runway capable of handling up to Boeing 727-size commercial aircraft and

limited port facilities. In virtually all cases state and federal governments lack sufficient expertise to manage the myriad of government services necessary to provide the foundation for the infusion of private investment. The potential for growth in tourism is limited to date. In summary, government leaders are continually faced with trying to provide and expand essential services such as health services, roads, schools, and power generation while at the same time keeping out of debt. (4:14)

At the national level the broad mission of the civic action program is two-fold. First, from our perspective CATs are on station to present a favorable US image through its quality members and to introduce the local population to our basic values and culture. Second, we are there to assist in nation-building and in helping to develop the host nation's infrastructure. In order to accomplish these objectives, the CAT program concentrates its efforts in four specific missions. First, the CAT program participates in small-scale vertical and horizontal (earth-moving) construction projects, such as farm-to-market roads, culverts, land clearing, landscaping, public schools, and government facilities. Maximum focus is placed at the community level on the essential needs of the people. Second, the program trains selected individuals from the local population in basic skills such as carpentry, plumbing, electricity, heavy equipment operation,

maintenance, engineering management, surveying, and health services. Funded by state governments, this one year of training with CAT members culminates in a diploma presented by the State Governor or his representative and usually results in employment with a governmental agency or private firm. Third, the Medical program (MEDCAP) is designed to provide medical assistance, education, and training to governmental health agencies and the local population. Historically, 500-800 people are seen per month through the MEDCAP. Fourth, the CAT participates in numerous community relations activities designed to educate both our military personnel and the local people on each other's customs and values. CAT personnel host numerous sporting activities, movies, Boy Scout functions, and holiday open houses, to name just a few. Each team fields baseball and basketball teams which participate in league competition. The community relations program also gives the CAT an opportunity to attend host nation functions in churches, schools, and surrounding communities. Community relations clearly fosters a positive image of the US serviceman and contributes significantly to his understanding of the local population. (7:1,8)

Having discussed their broad and specific missions, an understanding of the CAT personnel composition is essential. Each CAT is composed of one officer and 12 enlisted personnel as follows: (7:2-1)

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
a. <u>Officer in Charge (OIC)</u> . Pay grade 02-03, a graduate engineer or architect (or having equivalent experience). Practical experience with an operational unit is essential.	1
b. <u>Assistant Officer in Charge (AOIC)</u> . Pay grade E-7 or above. Construction specialists in equipment operation, mechanic or general building with extensive experience operating construction units and in personnel administration.	1
c. <u>Equipment Operators</u> . One E-5 or above, one E-4 or above. Both to have extensive experience with wide variety of construction equipment operation including crane/drag line operation.	2
d. <u>Carpenter/Woodcraftman/Mason</u> . One E-6 (unless AOIC is builder in which case one E-5), one E-4 or above, both experienced in carpentry, masonry/concrete and timber construction.	2
e. <u>Steel Worker/Welder</u> . One E-4 or above. Experienced in gas and arc welding, cutting, sheet metal fabrication, structural steel erection and pioneer-type rigging.	1
f. <u>Construction Equipment Mechanic</u> . One E-6 (unless AOIC is Construction Equipment Mechanic, in which case one E-5), one E-4 or above, experienced in maintenance of a variety of automotive and construction equipment including Lorain Crane. Experience in parts procurement and stock level determination is also required for one of the mechanics.	2
g. <u>Utilities Man/Plumber/Refrigeration Mechanic</u> . One E-4 or above, experienced in plumbing, layout, pump installation and maintenance, refrigeration and air conditioning and well drilling.	1
h. <u>Construction Electrician</u> . One E-4 or above. Experienced in interior wiring, pole line construction and small power plant installation, maintenance and operations.	1
i. <u>Engineering Aide/Surveyor/Draftman</u> . One E-4 or above, experienced in planning and estimating, drafting, surveying and soil analysis.	1

j. Hospital Corpsman/Medic. One E-5 or above, trained in a field medicine, public health and personal hygiene, and qualified for independent duty.

1

TOTAL

13

Although the team composition is based on Navy criteria and ratings, the other services have comparable skilled personnel. Based on anticipated construction projects, the OIC has the flexibility to change some of the team composition, but the total of 13 is fixed. In the case of the Army, 12 of the team members have engineering related skills and come from the 84th Engineer Battalion. The medic is attached from a Special Forces Group and is capable of handling minor surgery. His primary focus remains the medical care of the team and base camp sanitation. For the most part, CAT personnel are well-trained prior to their deployment, and they receive additional cultural and base camp operations instruction during a one-week orientation and coordination visit through Guam. (4:14)

The basic equipment allowance is identified for each of the five CATs and is as follows:

TEAM EQUIPMENT ALLOWANCE (11:Appendix)

<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Truck, 1/4 Ton Utility	1
Truck, 1 Ton Cargo	2
Truck, 2 Ton Dump	2
Trailer, 1-1/2 Ton	1
Trailer, Tank, 400 Gallon	1
Trailer, Tilt Top, 12 Ton	1
Mixer, Concrete Portable	1
Grader, Motor	1
Loader, Front End Rubber Tire	1
Roller, Vibratory	1
Tractor, Crawler	1
Generator, 30 KW	1
Welder, Arc	1
Pump, Centrifugal	1
Steam Cleaner	1
Floodlight Trailer	1
<hr/> TOTAL	<hr/> 18

To facilitate maintenance and repair parts availability, all equipment is Navy purchased and identical to that used in

Mobile Seabee Construction Battalions. Unfortunately, the Army and the Air Force personnel are not trained on most of the Navy equipment. Thus, some on-the-job training is required and is conducted on-station during a one week turnover period. What is essential is that maintenance personnel expeditiously become familiar with Navy requisitioning procedures. To increase readiness, additional authorization exists for the stockage of repair parts well above normal limits. Local civilian vendors, if available, seldom have repair parts and shipment time from the CONUS is usually excessive. With long supply lines, corrosive climate, and mostly unpaved roads, increased preventive maintenance and service is absolutely necessary.

Deployed personnel on CATs live in austere but adequate base camps that have the following facilities: an operations/medical facility that contains a Military Affiliated Radio Station (MARS) communication system that provides a link with the Navy Headquarters on Guam and the service component in Hawaii; a motor pool/power generation/POC facility; a dining/supply facility; living quarters (Navy standard seahuts); a latrine; a water purification and distribution facility; a carpentry shop; and various recreational facilities. A power boat is provided for water transportation and recreation. (4:14) Monthly resupply and medical evacuation is provided to each CAT by the Military

Airlift Command, 43rd Support Group, Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. (7:5)

The success of each CAT depends largely on the abilities of the OIC. In addition to being the team commander, he is often the senior US military officer on the island. He acts as the technical advisor to both local, state, and federal government officials on construction matters. He must coordinate all CAT activities to insure proper funding and materials are available, and that projects are properly prioritized. This is normally conducted through a monthly Civic Action Coordinating Committee (CACC), attended by all municipality chiefs and key government agency representatives. The OIC must be flexible and sensitive to the needs of the host government. To enhance community support he needs the backing of the top government officials. Since the Compact of Free Association was signed, we now have an American Embassy in place. These political representatives can be and should be the OIC's link with the federal and state senior leaders. Prior to the Compact, the OIC routinely met with state governors soliciting their influence and support for construction projects. Finally, the OIC must have a strong relationship with government agencies and private firms that have heavy engineering equipment. With the use of all available assets, roads can be built more efficiently and the state can be more responsive during the aftermath of typhoons and

other frequent natural disasters. In summary, the OIC must be a man of action, a competent problem solver, an excellent communicator, and an extremely flexible leader. (7:6-7)

The CAT program in the FSM and Palau is truly outstanding and mutually beneficial. All broad objectives are being achieved as the teams focus on their four specific missions. Numerous highly visible and much appreciated construction projects have been recently completed to include the main airport passenger terminal and the circumferential roadway on Pohnpei, and the 55 foot single span reinforced concrete vehicle bridge in Utwe Harbor, Kosrae. Especially noteworthy is the amount of local labor support during construction which resulted in giving the local population an appreciation of ownership and pride. Valuable skills were passed on to numerous local people that they can utilize long after the CATs depart. Our soldiers, airmen, and sea-bees have not only participated firsthand in the nation-building process, but they themselves received valuable training, confidence, and self-esteem. They learn to be better leaders and are able to adapt to this environment.

Although the current CAT program in the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of Palau is effective, there is room for improvement. In the following chapter I will examine some alternatives for expanding our civic action program.

CHAPTER VII

A PROPOSAL FOR THE POTENTIAL USE OF EXPANDED US CIVIC ACTION IN THE PACIFIC

In theory, emerging nations can greatly benefit from the use of their own military forces in the social and economic development process. However, as is often the case in the Pacific Basin, these tiny island nations do not have an organic military and have very limited resources. Political leaders are faced with having to develop their country's infrastructure with few realistic courses of action. The Soviets have recognized this and can respond with payment for both fishing and basing rights. The lessons learned in the cases involving Kiribati and Vanuatu clearly illustrate Soviet intent and strategy. The United States must be sensitive and develop a pro-active, long-range peacetime strategy based on sincere concern for the needs of the people in these developing countries. We must sow the economic and social seeds that will allow us to reap the benefits of limiting Soviet expansion and influence and maintain stability.

The Departments of Defense and State must combine their resources and efforts in a collective civic action strategy. One should recognize the economic realities in the US and understand that the 1987 military assistance program budget in the Pacific has been reduced by 70 percent

from \$370 million to \$110 million. (8:139) Thus, it is absolutely paramount that DOD and DOS efforts be properly coordinated and directed because they have mutually supporting goals. The purpose for this chapter is to examine this concept, focusing on the advantages and disadvantages of various civic action options in the Pacific Basin.

An emerging nation requires assistance from outside during its development stage.

The assistance which countries need from outside if they are to develop is of two kinds. In the first place they need capital . . . Underdeveloped countries may require two sorts of capital. They will need from outside some of the equipment and supplies required to construct particular development projects. They will also frequently need a certain volume of food and consumer goods to permit them to divert their own labor and other resources from consumption to development. But in addition to capital, they will also need a great deal of technical assistance, a transfer of knowledge and skills from other parts of the world. (14:22-23)

The United States and our allies can provide that outside help. I would propose that the US seek to establish an economic partnership with all friendly nations in the Pacific to include: Japan, Australia, ASEAN, and the NICs (Taiwan, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea). Such an economic organization could provide much needed capital investment and technical assistance to these developing nations. If focused properly, the economic potential and resultant political stability would be in the interests of all nations in the region. This concept could involve the

United States and its allies providing non-combat military forces and/or designated civilian personnel in technical assistance roles.

Even if we assume our allies could not participate, the US could still conduct a civic action program in a bilateral arrangement with various developing nations. Obviously this would be a more expensive approach but still possible. In any event, an understanding of the importance of an expanded military civic action program to the Department of Defense is absolutely vital.

Civic action is an outstanding training opportunity and tests various aspects of military readiness. Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger's "Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1988," stated: "We oppose the expansion of influence, control, or territory by nations opposed to freedom . . . Our basic defense strategy is deterrence, but should deterrence fail, our forces must be fully combat ready and prepared to go to war and win."

(21:41-46) The deployment of non-combat support units for civic action duty fully supports this principle. Nation-building has a direct impact in opposing Soviet influence. It further provides a realistic mechanism to test both deployment and sustainment support systems in remote and unfamiliar locations. It allows both individuals and units an opportunity to gain insight and develop confidence.

Training can be further provided to selected members of the

local population thus developing the nation's infrastructure. The Pacific Basin serves as an ideal training area for Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) operations. Adopting an expanded civic action role in the Pacific further exercises our mobilization activities to include the Military Airlift and Sealift Commands. Furthermore, it allows the US to be more responsive to natural disasters in the region, which pays big dividends in enhancing our positive image. Without question, the overall benefit to the United States is it enhances our readiness posture, our understanding of the Pacific theater, and therefore our ability to win a war in this arena.

An analysis would need to be made as to the size and composition of the CATs. Clearly this is situation dependent. The current program in FSM and Palau could serve as the base, with modifications as required primarily due to the host nations' desires and their current level of development. Basically, I believe that the planners must consider what additional skills will be required beyond engineering, maintenance, and medical assistance, to include: civil affairs, communications, transportation, and language. The use of Mobile Training Teams to survey a nation's requirements could be useful.

Another consideration in civic action is the method of employment of our military forces. Specifically, how long will the military remain in a country and what do we

hope to accomplish? In some cases, we may wish to leave CATs in place for extended periods. On the other hand, it may be more advantageous to focus on small-scale construction projects. For example, once materials are on station, bring in a CAT for a limited period of time, and once a project is completed they depart. This is the approach often used in joint training exercises or exchanges, such as the case with Exercise Balikatan in the Philippines. In December 1986, US and Philippine military engineers worked side-by-side in constructing small-scale support facilities at Fort Magsaysay, the Philippine Army's major training facility north of Manila. Several reconnaissance visits were conducted in advance to plan the training schedule and to procure materials. As a result, the training was well-coordinated and efficiently executed.

Critics will recognize that there is no such thing as a free lunch with civic action. Personnel from existing units are used to field these CATs. I believe the short-term sacrifice in parent unit readiness is greatly enhanced with the first class training benefits. We gain a better trained fighting force. Also, for the most part these CAT personnel are forward deployed in the sense that they are closer to likely areas of conflict than personnel serving on US soil. Nonetheless, a more coordinated effort would have to be made to increase the military personnel pool if such an expanded CAT program were adopted. I would recommend all

personnel with appropriate skills in Army and Air Force units that have recognized missions in the Pacific theater be included. For instance, reserve forces could also be included. It should be noted that Army Reserve units in the Pacific are being used in a limited role in the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

Logistical support (especially repair parts) is absolutely critical to the success of CAT. If an expanded civic action program were incorporated, Military Airlift and Sealift Command assets would become more essential. DOD would need to determine how to support such a mission. Having discussed a variety of issues concerning military civic action, one need recognize how this can be further expanded.

From an overall US perspective, I believe the Department of State should be the primary proponent for an expanded civic action effort rather than the DOD. Since most island nations lack military forces, and because we generally have diplomatic contact already established with an ambassador, high commissioner, etc., it makes sense to utilize this network. In many cases the US has Peace Corps personnel already on-station that focus on economic development. US military forces could be utilized to supplement the Peace Corps with technical skills and construction equipment. Strong consideration should be given to include the Department of Health and Welfare so as

to provide additional medical support as part of the civic action package. Each organization would maintain their organizational structure, but would work for the senior DOS government official who would serve as the interface with the host nation. The DOS would be responsible for coordinating all civic action similar to how the CAT OICs do in FSM and Palau. All funding for such civic action would be redirected to and controlled by the DOS. In short, this type of coordinated effort would have a real and positive impact. An examination of the Peace Corps and its mission is necessary to understanding how the two programs can be integrated.

President John F. Kennedy signed the Peace Corps Act on 22 September 1961, establishing the Peace Corps as a semi-autonomous government agency in the State Department, that is required by law to coordinate its activities with the other official arms of US foreign policy. (22:128) Sargent Shriver was appointed as its first director, and he was instrumental in establishing the three goals of the Peace Corps: 1) to help the people of interested countries and areas in meeting needs for trained manpower, 2) to help promote a better understanding of Americans on the part of the people served, and 3) to help promote a better understanding of other people on the part of Americans. (23:3) Basically, the philosophy of the Peace Corps is one of service where volunteers can make a difference at the

local level. (22:287) It was an early dramatic step in the direction of global cooperation and has had the greatest impact on people's attitudes. (22:302) Throughout its 25-year existence, in excess of 120,000 volunteers have served in approximately 90 countries, operating an average annual budget of \$100 million. (32:18)

The involvement of Peace Corps volunteers in the Pacific Basin is as follows: (23:4)

<u>Nation</u>	<u>Year Entered</u>	<u>Year Departed</u>
Cook Islands	1981	-
Fiji	1969	-
Indonesia	1963	1965
Kiribati	1973	-
Malaysia	1962	-
Micronesia	1966	-
Papua New Guinea	1980	-
Philippines	1961	-
Solomon Island	1971	-
Tonga	1967	-
Tuvalu	1973	-
Western Samoa	1967	-

The goals of the Peace Corps are very similar to military civic action ongoing in FSM and Palau, as can be seen in the following statement:

Though the Peace Corps volunteers carry no rifles to battle, they serve in the Third World, home for hundreds of millions of people whose ideology is to create a decent life for themselves, a life that measures richness with dignity, that is free of fear and instability. The time to reach them is not when military action becomes necessary, when war or violent revolution is impending. Peace Corps volunteers are not trained to deal with enemies bearing arms. Their enemies are hunger, ignorance, and disease. By forcing these enemies into retreat, the Peace Corps serves humanity interests, and America's. (32:21)

Thus, the bottom line of this proposal is that the US must seek to maximize the impact of the limited resources available to implement a national strategy in support of its interests in the Pacific Basin. The Peace Corps currently has volunteers in many island nations. In some cases, such as in Micronesia, military civic action teams are also present. What is necessary is to combine their efforts to maximize their potential value. This is currently not happening in most instances. For example, on the island of Kosrae, each organization is operating independently and without any formal coordination of effort. What I witnessed firsthand was an informal bond, friendship, and working relationship between the Peace Corps volunteers and CAT personnel. Having similar goals, but quite different capabilities, these US activities complemented each other to the benefit of the local population. What is needed, however, is a more standard or formal arrangement with a DOS official overwatching all civic action efforts. In this manner, the host nations' political leaders' needs will best be served using the DOS as the US political interface.

There are, however, some potential disadvantages in combining the military civic action resources and the Peace Corps which will require further study. As is the case with any federal bureaucracies, institutional "turf" battles could occur between the DOD, DOS, and the Peace Corps in establishing lines of authority, etc. By design, the Peace Corps is a semi-autonomous agency under the DOS that has its own independent budget. This was to insure that the Peace Corps could not be viewed throughout the world as an extension of the C.I.A. In formally combining the military civic action program with the Peace Corps, some could argue that by accident the outside world might misunderstand US intent. In addition, combining operating budgets of these activities may require some further study and additional congressional legislation. Nonetheless, given these issues I strongly believe these disadvantages are overshadowed by the advantages of this combined and cost-effective peacetime strategy.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS


US Civic Action is a pragmatic, inexpensive, and potentially decisive approach to our long-range Pacific Basin peacetime strategy. Civic Action is not an innovative idea. However, what is innovative at this point in history is for the United States to re-examine how we can best utilize available resources to be most effective. The Peace Corps has similar goals and is also at a crossroads. In the words of former director Loret Miller Ruppe:

The world needs those threads of peace and friendship which Peace Corps volunteers weave for the developing countries and for America. They are living and working expressions of the best that is in all of us. Now is the time to invest in the precious commodity; now is the time for a Peace Corps renaissance. (23:Preface)

Clearly what is needed is a consolidation of the available talent in our peacetime strategy. Military Civic Action has similar goals and objectives and can be viewed as the Peace Corps in uniform. Therefore, it is in the best interests of our nation to seriously develop a long-term approach. The proponent of this combined effort should be the Department of State who can best interface with the government of the host nation. Funding could be the only real drawback; however, I believe this can be overcome if supported by our senior civilian and military leaders. Congressional and public support for this consolidated effort should be eased

by the fact that forms of economic aid will get directly down to the community level. Such an understanding will enhance our military training and develop better coordination with all US agencies in a host nation. It will provide increased training and numerous services to the local people, thus further developing that nation's infrastructure. In summary, it will insure our successful peacetime strategy with minimum cost.

In the words of President Reagan: "Once we see a need, we want to serve--even when the neighbor we reach out to help is halfway around the world. This is the American way. Giving, learning, and sharing is what the Peace Corps is all about." (23:11-12) It's what Military Civic Action is about as well. Expanding the use of these resources throughout the Pacific Basin is truly a win-win peacetime strategy.



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